Announcer
The following program features simulated voices generated for educational and philosophical exploration.
Leonard Jones
Good afternoon. I'm Leonard Jones.
Jessica Moss
And I'm Jessica Moss. Welcome to Simulectics Radio.
Jessica Moss
Today we're asking one of the most fundamental questions in ethics: do moral truths exist independently of human attitudes and practices, or are values something we construct? This question cuts to the heart of what morality is and whether it has any objective authority over us.
Leonard Jones
The issue connects to broader metaphysical questions about what exists. If moral facts are real, what kind of things are they? How do we gain epistemic access to them? And how do they relate to the natural facts described by science? These are the questions moral realism must answer.
Jessica Moss
Our guest is Dr. Sharon Street, Professor of Philosophy at New York University, whose work on constructivism and evolutionary debunking arguments has fundamentally shaped contemporary metaethics. Dr. Street, welcome.
Dr. Sharon Street
Thank you. These questions about the nature of value are absolutely central to understanding what we're doing when we make moral judgments.
Leonard Jones
Let's start with definitions. What exactly is moral realism claiming?
Dr. Sharon Street
Moral realism is the view that there are moral facts or truths that hold independently of what anyone thinks or feels about them. Torture is wrong, according to the realist, not because we disapprove of it or because our culture condemns it, but because there's a mind-independent moral fact that makes it wrong. These facts are supposed to be objective in the sense that they're not constituted by our attitudes toward them.
Jessica Moss
What's the alternative? If moral facts aren't independent of us, what are they?
Dr. Sharon Street
There are several anti-realist positions. Error theory says moral judgments purport to describe mind-independent facts but are systematically false—there are no such facts. Constructivism, which is my view, says moral facts are constituted by what we have reason to value from within the practical standpoint. They're not independent of our evaluative attitudes, but they're not arbitrary either. They're constrained by principles of practical reason.
Leonard Jones
Let me be precise about this. When you say moral facts are constituted by our attitudes, are you saying morality is subjective—that anything goes if someone values it?
Dr. Sharon Street
Not at all. The constructivist view is that moral truth is relative to the practical standpoint, but once you're in that standpoint—which all agents necessarily are—there are objective constraints. Some values cohere better than others with the rest of your evaluative commitments. Some are rationally required by principles you already accept. It's like mathematics being objective even though mathematical truths are in some sense our construction.
Jessica Moss
You've developed what's called an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. Can you explain what that is?
Dr. Sharon Street
The basic idea is that evolutionary forces have profoundly shaped our moral beliefs. We believe cooperation is good, kin have special claims on us, and fairness matters because these beliefs promoted reproductive fitness in our ancestors. But here's the problem for the realist: evolutionary forces don't track moral truth—they track fitness. So we'd have our current moral beliefs even if realist moral truths were completely different or didn't exist at all. That makes it miraculous if our beliefs happen to match the supposed mind-independent moral facts.
Leonard Jones
This seems like a genealogical argument—undermining beliefs by showing their causal origin is unreliable. But can't the realist respond that even if evolution shaped our basic moral dispositions, we can use reason to correct and refine them, arriving at genuine moral knowledge?
Dr. Sharon Street
That's a common response, but I think it fails. The problem is that our capacities for moral reasoning are themselves products of evolution. We don't have some pure faculty of reason that operates independently of our evolved psychology. The standards we use to assess and refine our moral beliefs are themselves shaped by evolutionary pressures. So reason can't rescue realism here—it's evolutionary influence all the way down.
Jessica Moss
But doesn't your argument prove too much? Our perceptual faculties and mathematical intuitions are also products of evolution. Does that mean we should be skeptical of science and mathematics too?
Dr. Sharon Street
There's an important disanalogy. Evolution shaped our perceptual faculties precisely because accurate perception of the physical world promoted survival. Organisms that correctly perceived predators and food sources survived. So there's a tracking relationship between our perceptual beliefs and physical facts. But there's no analogous tracking relationship between evolutionary pressures and supposed realist moral facts. Evolution selected for beliefs that promoted fitness, not moral truth.
Leonard Jones
Let's consider third-factor explanations. Maybe evolution shaped both our moral beliefs and moral reality—perhaps moral facts supervene on natural facts about cooperation and wellbeing that were also relevant to fitness. Wouldn't that explain the correlation?
Dr. Sharon Street
This is a sophisticated realist response, but I think it collapses into constructivism. If you say moral facts just are facts about what promotes cooperation and wellbeing, you're giving a naturalistic reduction of morality. But then why call these moral facts? They're just natural facts that we happen to value. The realist wanted moral facts to be irreducibly normative—to provide reasons independent of our attitudes. A naturalistic reduction abandons that claim.
Jessica Moss
What about non-naturalist realism—the view that moral facts are sui generis, neither natural nor reducible? Philosophers like Derek Parfit have defended this view.
Dr. Sharon Street
Non-naturalist realism faces severe epistemological problems. If moral facts are radically different from natural facts, how do we gain knowledge of them? We can't perceive them or detect them empirically. The realist typically posits some special faculty of moral intuition, but that's precisely where the evolutionary debunking argument bites. Our moral intuitions were shaped by evolutionary pressures, not by tracking non-natural moral facts.
Leonard Jones
There's a methodological question here. Shouldn't we take our moral judgments at face value unless we have strong reason not to? When I judge that torture is wrong, I seem to be making a claim about an objective fact. Why should evolutionary considerations override that phenomenology?
Dr. Sharon Street
Because phenomenology can be misleading. Our moral judgments feel objective, but that feeling doesn't establish metaphysical conclusions. It might just reflect features of our psychology—perhaps evolution built in a sense of objectivity because it made moral motivations more effective. We need arguments, not just appeals to how things seem.
Jessica Moss
Let's turn to constructivism. You said moral facts are constituted by what we have reason to value. But what determines what we have reason to value? Isn't there circularity there?
Dr. Sharon Street
Constructivism starts from the practical standpoint—the standpoint any agent must occupy when deliberating about what to do. From within that standpoint, you already have evaluative commitments. The question is which further commitments are rationally required by the ones you already have. It's a coherentist picture: moral truth is what coheres with your evaluative attitudes under idealized reflection.
Leonard Jones
But different people might reach different coherent sets of values. Does constructivism imply moral relativism—that morality varies from person to person?
Dr. Sharon Street
That depends on how much convergence there is in human evaluative attitudes and practical reason. I think there's more convergence than people often assume, given our shared human nature and the constraints of practical rationality. But yes, constructivism allows that ideal agents starting from different evaluative standpoints might arrive at somewhat different moral conclusions. I don't see that as a cost—it seems to match the reality of moral disagreement.
Jessica Moss
Doesn't that undermine moral criticism? If someone with different values arrives at different moral conclusions through coherent reasoning, on what grounds can we criticize them?
Dr. Sharon Street
We can criticize them from within our own evaluative standpoint. When we say their values are wrong, we're saying they conflict with values we have reason to hold. That's genuine moral criticism, even if it's not based on mind-independent facts. The realist promises a kind of Archimedean point outside all evaluative standpoints, but I don't think that's coherent or needed for robust moral discourse.
Leonard Jones
Let me press on the epistemology again. Realists can explain moral disagreement by saying people make mistakes—they fail to track the moral facts. How does the constructivist explain persistent disagreement among informed, thoughtful people?
Dr. Sharon Street
Different people start from different evaluative attitudes and life experiences. Even under ideal reflection, these differences might not fully converge. That's not a failure of rationality—it's a reflection of the fact that morality is constructed from within particular evaluative standpoints. The realist's explanation of disagreement as error requires saying that lots of thoughtful, well-informed people are systematically mistaken, which seems less plausible.
Jessica Moss
What about moral progress? It seems we've made genuine moral progress on issues like slavery and women's rights. Doesn't that suggest we're tracking objective moral truths we previously failed to recognize?
Dr. Sharon Street
Constructivism can explain moral progress perfectly well. As we've gained more information, thought more carefully, and extended moral consideration more consistently, we've arrived at values that cohere better with our deepest commitments to equality and human dignity. Progress doesn't require mind-independent moral facts—it just requires that we're getting better at understanding what our own values commit us to.
Leonard Jones
There's a worry about normativity. If moral facts are just our construction, why should they have any authority over us? Why not just reject morality if it conflicts with what we want?
Dr. Sharon Street
Because the question 'why should I be moral?' already presupposes the practical standpoint. You're asking for a reason, and reasons are evaluative notions. You can't step outside the evaluative standpoint to ask whether you should be evaluative—that's incoherent. Morality has authority because it's constituted by the reasons you already recognize from within the standpoint you must occupy as an agent.
Jessica Moss
How does this view handle radical evil—people who seem to genuinely reject basic moral values? Are they making a mistake, or do they just have different values?
Dr. Sharon Street
That's a hard case. I think most apparent cases of radical evil involve some combination of false empirical beliefs, failure to extend moral consideration consistently, and values that don't actually cohere under reflection. But could there be someone whose values genuinely cohere around cruelty and domination? That's a difficult question. I'm inclined to think such values are rationally unstable in ways that would emerge under ideal reflection.
Leonard Jones
What about the relationship between moral facts and natural facts? Do moral properties supervene on natural properties?
Dr. Sharon Street
Yes, I think moral properties supervene on natural properties, but not because moral facts are reducible to natural facts. The supervenience is explained by the fact that our evaluative attitudes respond to natural features of situations. When we judge an action wrong, we're responding to natural features like its effects on wellbeing. But the wrongness is constituted by our evaluative response, not by the natural features alone.
Jessica Moss
This connects to the is-ought gap that Hume identified. Can you derive ought from is?
Dr. Sharon Street
The constructivist view respects the is-ought gap. You can't derive evaluative conclusions from purely descriptive premises—you need at least one evaluative premise to get an evaluative conclusion. But once you're in the practical standpoint, which involves having evaluative attitudes, you can derive further evaluative conclusions. The mistake is thinking you could derive values from a completely value-free description of the world.
Leonard Jones
How does your view relate to Kant's constructivism? You both emphasize the role of practical reason in constituting morality.
Dr. Sharon Street
There are affinities, but also differences. Kant thought there was a single procedure of practical reason—the categorical imperative—that all rational agents must follow. I'm more pluralistic. I think practical rationality involves coherence among our evaluative attitudes, but different agents might achieve coherence in different ways. I don't think there's a single algorithm of practical reason that delivers unique moral conclusions.
Jessica Moss
What are the implications of this debate for practical ethics? Does it matter whether realism or constructivism is true when we're deciding what to do?
Dr. Sharon Street
For many practical purposes, it doesn't matter much. Both views can support robust moral conclusions and serious moral reasoning. But it might matter in cases of deep moral disagreement. The realist thinks there's always a fact of the matter about who's right, even if we can't access it. The constructivist is more comfortable acknowledging that some disagreements might not have a resolution beyond each party's evaluative standpoint.
Leonard Jones
Where does this debate stand currently? Is there emerging consensus, or is it genuinely open?
Dr. Sharon Street
It remains vigorously contested. Non-naturalist realism has sophisticated defenders like Parfit and Scanlon. Naturalist realism is defended by philosophers like Richard Boyd and David Brink. Constructivism has gained ground, partly because of evolutionary concerns. But there's no consensus. Each view faces serious objections, and the debate continues to evolve.
Jessica Moss
Dr. Street, you've given us a rigorous examination of fundamental questions about value and reality. Thank you.
Dr. Sharon Street
Thank you. These questions about whether morality is our creation or discovery shape how we understand ourselves as evaluative beings.
Leonard Jones
That's our program. Until tomorrow, consider whether your moral beliefs track independent facts or express your practical commitments.
Jessica Moss
And whether evolution has given us moral insight or merely useful illusions. Good afternoon.