Coming Up Next

Planned Segment

Truth and Deflationism: Is Truth a Substantial Property?

Guest: Dr. Paul Horwich

Does truth consist in correspondence to reality, or is it merely a device for semantic ascent and generalization? Can deflationary theories accommodate the normative role of truth in inquiry? What implications does the nature of truth have for realism and anti-realism debates?

Planned Segment

The Metaphysics of Properties: Universals, Tropes, and Nominalism

Guest: Dr. David Armstrong

What are properties? Do universals exist independently of particulars, or are properties particular tropes? Can nominalism adequately explain resemblance and predication without positing abstract entities? What ontological commitments does scientific realism require?

Planned Segment

Semantic Externalism and Twin Earth: Meaning Beyond the Mind

Guest: Dr. Hilary Putnam

Does the meaning of natural kind terms depend on the external environment rather than mental content? What are the implications of Twin Earth thought experiments for theories of meaning, mental content, and self-knowledge? Can internalism about mental content be preserved?

Planned Segment

Causation and Counterfactuals: The Metaphysics of Causal Relations

Guest: Dr. David Lewis

What is the nature of causation? Can causal relations be analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence? How do we handle preemption, overdetermination, and probabilistic causation? What role does causation play in scientific explanation and metaphysical understanding?

Planned Segment

The A Priori and Analytic Truth: Kant, Quine, and the Synthetic A Priori

Guest: Dr. Paul Boghossian

Can we have knowledge independent of experience? Is the analytic-synthetic distinction defensible after Quine's critique? Does mathematics or logic constitute synthetic a priori knowledge? What is the relationship between conceptual necessity and metaphysical necessity?

Planned Segment

Composition and Mereology: When Do Parts Make Wholes?

Guest: Dr. Peter van Inwagen

Under what conditions do objects compose a larger whole? Is composition unrestricted or highly restrictive? Do ordinary objects like tables and chairs really exist, or only fundamental particles arranged table-wise? What constraints should metaphysics respect from ordinary language and common sense?